We find systematic evidence that the leadership of overconfident CEOs induces stakeholders (i.e. suppliers and employees) to take actions that contribute to their firms' success. By being intentionally over-exposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms, overconfident CEOs signal private information along the supply chain. Overconfident CEOs are more likely to attract suppliers and induce greater relationship-specific investment. They also gain stronger commitments from their own employees. Our evidence suggests that overconfident CEOs achieve these commitments through their leadership actions rather than their words.
Keywords: Signaling, Stakeholders, CEO overconfidence, Leadership
JEL Classification Code: G32, L15
[2015년 제 4차] Are Overconfident CEOs Good Leaders?:Evidence from
작성자 : 관리자
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게시일 :
2015-12-30